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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 960025-CA 
BILLIE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellee. Priority No. 12 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellee Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company (hereafter 
"Farm Bureau") urges this Court to deny Billie Peterson's 
(hereafter "Peterson") underinsured benefits on three grounds: (1) 
that the exclusive remedy provision, Utah Code Annotated, Section 
35-1-60 (Supp. 1994), precludes recovery of underinsurance 
benefits; (2) that the Legislature intended the exclusive remedy 
provision to preclude underinsurance benefits; and (3) the failure 
to recover underlying liability insurance precludes recovery of 
underinsurance benefits. Its contentions are wrong. Instead the 
exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-60 
does not bar Peterson from recovering underinsured benefits; the 
legislature did not intend to preclude underinsurance coverage for 
injured employees; Peterson is legally entitled to recover 
underinsured benefits; and, Farm Bureau's alleged inability to 
receive subrogation is irrelevant. Peterson will address these 
issues in order. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION, U.C.A., SECTION 35-1-60, DOES NOT 
BAR PETERSON FROM RECOVERING UNDERINSURED BENEFITS. 
Farm Bureau argues that the exclusive remedy provision 
contained in Utah's Workers' Compensation Act precludes the 
recovery of underinsured benefits by an injured employee. Farm 
Bureau's argument misapprehends the theoretical underpinnings of 
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act and the exclusive remedy provision 
itself. The exclusive remedy provision was never intended to 
preclude an injured employee's recovery against his own 
underinsurance policy. Such an approach represents an unwarranted 
expansion of the exclusive remedy provision and allows Farm Bureau 
to reap an unearned windfall. 
It is axiomatic in Worker's Compensation jurisprudence 
that: 
[o]nce a Workmen's Compensation Act has become 
applicable either through compulsion or 
election, it affords the exclusive remedy for 
the injury by the employee or his dependents 
against the employer and his insurance 
carrier. This is part of the quid quo pro in 
which the sacrifices and gains of employers 
and employees are to some extent put in 
balance, for, while employer assumes a new 
liability without fault, he is relieved of the 
prospect of large damage verdicts. 
Larson, The Law of Workman's Compensation, Volume 2A 
Section 65.11 (1995). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recognized as much in Hunsaker 
v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 899 (Utah 1993) where the Court stated that 
"[t]he exclusive remedy principle embodies the basic quid quo pro 
that underlies Utah's Workers' Compensation scheme." Further, 
"[u]nder the workers' compensation scheme, employees are able to 
recover for job-related injuries without showing fault or being 
subject to defenses such as the fellow servant rule and employers 
are protected from suits by employees." Id. (emphasis added). See 
also Bingham v. Lagoon, 707 P.2d 678, 679 (Utah 1985)(emphasis 
added)("The essence of workers' compensation system is that it is 
a mutual arrangement of reciprocal rights between an employer and 
an employee whereby both parties give up and gain certain 
advantages." 
More recently in Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah, 889 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1994) the Court stated that "[t]he 
Workers' Compensation Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that 
provides remedies for injuries to workers occurring in the course 
of their employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu of common law 
tort actions." 
Farm Bureau does not address the theoretical basis of the 
exclusive remedy provision, Farm Bureau inappropriately seeks to 
extend its effect to non-employers and non-employees. The above-
referenced cases illustrate that employees gave up the right to 
pursue common law tort actions against employers and co-employees, 
while employers gained freedom from excessive verdicts. Farm 
Bureau, as a non-employer and non-employee, is not entitled to 
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obtain a windfall from its statutory scheme. By entering into an 
agreement with Peterson and accepting premiums for underinsurance 
coverage, Farm Bureau entered into a contractual relationship with 
Peterson. The exclusive remedy provision was not intended by the 
Legislature to excuse third-party contractual obligations between 
an employee and employer. Petersons claim against Farm Bureau is 
more in the nature of a contract, rather than tort claim. 
Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision does not apply. 
Point II 
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO PRECLUDE UNDERINSURANCE COVERAGE 
FOR INJURED EMPLOYEES. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 31A-22-305(4)(b)(ii) 
explicitly provides that: "This coverage does not apply to an 
employee who is injured by an uninsured motorist, whose exclusive 
remedy is provided by Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation." 
Subsections (8) through (10) of Section 305 addressing underinsured 
coverage contains no similar provision. In the space of one 
statute, U.C.A. Section 31A-22-305, the Legislature stated its 
clear Legislative intent that an injured employee may not receive 
uninsured benefits. In that same statute, the Legislature fails to 
indicate that underinsurance is similarly unavailable to injured 
employees. Further, the Legislature carried over the requirement 
that uninsured benefits are "secondary to other insurance" over 
into the underinsurance section of the statute. Therefore, when 
the Legislature wanted a requirement or limitation to apply, it 
knew how to so provide. The Legislature provided for one of the 
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two uninsured limitations in the underinsured context* The failure 
of the Legislature to provide for "workers compensation" limitation 
in the underinsurance coverage is a clear indication of Legislative 
intent that the Legislature did not want an injured employee's 
access to underinsurance benefits limited. This omission is so 
fundamental and so obvious that it shows that the Legislature 
deliberately omitted the limitation in the underinsured context. 
For example, in Western Coating, Inc. v. Gibbons & Reed, 788 P.2d 
503, 506 (Utah 1990) the court addressed an apparent omission in 
Utah's Procurement Code. In a suit by a supplier under a payment 
bond, the court noted that: 
The Legislature had the opportunity to 
affirmatively indicate that remote tier 
suppliers were covered by the Utah Procurement 
Code. Instead, it chose language which seems 
to. . . limit public bond coverage. . . We 
therefore conclude that the intent of the 
legislature was to exclude remote tier 
suppliers such as [the plaintiff]. 
Id. at 506. 
Analogously in the instant case, the Legislature's direct 
omission in one portion of the statute of a phrase clearly stated 
in another portion of the same statute is indicative of a direct 
and unequivocal legislative intent that the underinsured coverage 
is not limited by the exclusive remedy provision. 
Apart from the plain language of the statute, there are 
sound policy reasons for not allowing an injured worker to receive 
uninsured benefits but allowing that same workers to receive 
underinsured benefits. Uninsured and underinsured benefits 
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represent two separate and distinct policies. Couch on Insurance 
2d (Rev.ed), Section 45:624 states that the policy underlying 
uninsured coverage is "to provide protection to a certain class of 
injured persons in the event of physical injury to covered persons 
where circumstances dictate that no coverage exists for 
compensation of their injuries." That is, Legislature wanted to 
make certain that a minimum level of compensation be provided to 
those injured by uninsured motorists. Conversely, underinsurance 
assumes a minimum level of coverage and seeks to provide an 
additional level of coverage for motorists that have not been fully 
compensated for their injuries. If a motorist receives workers' 
compensation benefits from a work-related automobile accident the 
underlying policy of uninsured coverage is satisfied, i.e. that at 
least some level of compensation is provided to the victim of an 
accident. However, the same does not hold true for underinsurance 
benefits. An injured employee may not be made whole by workers7 
compensation benefits. To the extent that this is true in any 
given case, the policy underlying underinsured benefits have not 
been furthered. Therefore, the structure of Section 305 could 
easily be said to reflect the reality of the different policy 
concerns underlying uninsured and underinsured policies. Although 
Farm Bureau cites numerous cases, Peterson is not aware of any 
which explicitly discuss the distinction between the recovery of 
uninsured versus underinsured benefits by an injured employee also 
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entitled to workers' compensation benefits.1 This case presents a 
unique opportunity for an appellate court to critically examine 
this issue in light of the disparate policy concerns underlying 
uninsured and underinsured policies. 
Farm Bureau characterizes this argument as a "minor 
technicality." See Appellee's Brief, p. 18. While Peterson 
concedes that insurance law can be very technical, this is not an 
adequate response to the argument. Farm Bureau engages in a 
lengthy proving of the obvious, citing fundamental principles of 
statutory construction, and then fails to address the statutory 
provision at issue, namely 31A-2-305.2 See Appellee's Brief, page 
18-22. After failing to address the fundamental statutory language 
at issue, Farm Bureau then mischaracterizes Neel v. State of Utah, 
889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995). On page 23 of its brief, Farm Bureau 
states that Neel held "that workers' compensation is the exclusive 
remedy of employees injured by uninsured and underinsured co-
employees or an employer." See also Appellee's Brief, page 10 
("The Utah Supreme Court in Neel v. State of Utah correctly 
1
 In Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 136, 
138-39 (N.D. 1991) declined to discuss the difference between 
uninsured and underinsured coverage noting only that the 
plaintiff had "failed to present any cogent reason" to 
distinguish the two and that both policies contain the phrase 
"legally entitled to recover." It is Peterson's contention 
that he has not only identified cogent, but compelling 
reasons, to differentiate between uninsured and underinsured 
coverage. 
2
 Rather than analyzing the language of Section 31A-22-
3 05, Farm Bureau instead reiterates Point I of its brief 
regarding the exclusive remedy provision. 
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interpreted the legislature's intent in holding that uninsured and 
underinsured coverage did not apply to an employee whose exclusive 
remedy is workers' compensation."). 
Even a cursory reading of Neel reveals that the Court did 
not hold, in the words of Farm Bureau, "that underinsured coverage 
did not apply to an employee whose exclusive remedy is workers' 
compensation." At issue in Neel was state employee's right to no-
fault benefits for injuries arising out of a work-related accident. 
The Neel court itself states its holding as follows: 
No-fault insurers, including self-insurers, 
are required to pay PIP benefits to injured 
employees to the extent those benefits exceed 
workers' compensation benefits. 
... 
In so holding, we overrule IML Freight insofar 
as it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
Id. at 926. 
Black's Law Dictionary 454 (6th Ed. 1990) defines dictum 
as: "Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of 
law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to 
determination of the case in hand. . . [w]hich lack the force of 
adjudication." See also Ruggles v. Ruggles. 860 P.2d 182, 189 n. 
8 (N.M. 1993)(statement "unnecessary to decision of the issue 
before the Court, was dictum, no matter how deliberately or 
emphatically phrased."). Inasmuch as the plaintiff in Neel never 
sought underinsurance benefits, any statements addressing 
underinsurance benefits in Neel are dictum and need not be followed 
by the Utah Court of Appeals. See Chino Valley v. Prescott, 638 
P.2d 1324, 1327 (Az. 1981)(Dictum is "a court's statement on a 
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question not necessarily involved in the case. . ., is without 
force of adjudication [and]. . . is not controlling as 
precedent."). Further, because the Utah Supreme Court did not 
consider the specific statutory language in Section 305 and did not 
have the benefit of briefing on the issue, this Court should not 
view the dictum as controlling. 
Finally, the out-of-state case law cited by Farm Bureau 
is distinguishable. The only case addressing underinsured benefits 
is Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 1991) 
is distinguishable. In Stuhlmiller. the plaintiff was injured in 
a work-related single vehicle accident. Id. at 137. The plaintiff 
was in his own car which was driven by a co-employee. Id. The 
plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits and then sued 
under the liability portion of his own insurance policy and the 
underinsurance policy of the co-employee's policy. Id. The court 
denied underinsurance benefits noting that the co-employee was 
statutorily immune from suit and not legally entitled to recover. 
Id. at 138. 
In the instant case, Peterson is not seeking underinsured 
benefits from a co-employee. Instead, Peterson has entered into a 
contractual relationship with a third-party, Farm Bureau, which is 
neither his employer nor co-employee. The fact that the plaintiff 
in Stuhlmiller sued his co-employee directly implicates the 
exclusive remedy provision. Farmers Bureau has no right to rely on 
the exclusive remedy provision, being neither an employer or co-
employee in this case. 
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The remaining cases cited by Farm Bureau appear to 
concern uninsured coverage and not underinsured coverage. Because 
underinsured coverage furthers a separate and distinct legislative 
goal than uninsured coverage, these cases are not controlling. 
Point III 
PETERSON IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDERINSURED BENEFITS 
Farm Bureau argues that Peterson may recover underinsured 
benefits because he is not "legally entitled to recover" damages 
from the co-employee who caused his injuries. This language is 
found both in the insurance contract and U.C.A. Section 31A-2-
305(9). The phrase "legally entitled to recover" becomes ambiguous 
in the underinsured context. The purpose of underinsured coverage 
is to allow insureds to recover more money when the primary policy 
limits are not sufficient to compensate the insured. Thus, 
underinsured coverage assumes3 the tortfeasor does not have 
adequate funds. Therefore, "legally entitled to recover" cannot 
mean the ability to recover money from the tortfeasor. A more 
common sense notion of "legally entitled to recover" is presented 
in Torres v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins., 849 P.2d 407 (Ok. 
1993) where the Oklahoma Supreme Court re-affirmed its long-
standing definition of "legally entitled to recover" in the 
3
 In fact, the exhaustion of the liability coverage of 
the tortfeasor seems to be a precondition for recovery of 
underinsured coverage. 
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uninsured/underinsured4 context. The court stated that: 
the phrase legally entitled to recover damages 
simply means the insured must be able to 
establish fault on the part of the uninsured 
motorist which gives rise to damages and prove 
the extent of those damages. 
Id. at 410. 
This definition furthers the policy of underinsured 
coverage by allowing employees injured in work-related automobile 
accidents to be made whole for their injuries. It also provides 
insurers a mechanism whereby they can assess whether an injured 
employee has been made whole. 
Point IV 
FARM BUREAU'S ALLEGED INABILITY TO RECEIVE SUBROGATION IS 
IRRELEVANT. 
Farm Bureau argues that if Peterson is able to recover 
underinsured benefits, it will be unable to obtain subrogation. 
This argument was considered and rejected in Torres v. Kansas City 
Fire & Marine Ins., 849 P.2d 407, 413 (Ok. 1993) where the court 
stated that "only where the insured engaged in some affirmative act 
or prejudicial conduct which destroyed the subrogation rights of 
the insurance carrier. . . [would] the carrier's liability under 
the UM endorsement be discharged." The court went on to state that 
"[t]he immunity of the workers' compensation laws which would bar 
any subrogation rights is not the result of any conduct on the part 
of the insured and affords no basis to deny recovery [under 
4
 The insurance policy in Torres is characterized as a 
"uninsured/underinsured" policy, yet most of the discussion 
focuses on uninsured coverage. 
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prior Oklahoma decision].11 Id. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has recently noted that 
"subrogation must not work any injustice to the rights of others." 
State Farm v. Northwestern National. 285 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 
(Utah 1996). 
Here, Farm Bureau seems to suggest that it is simply 
unfair for it to have to pay underinsured coverage when it is 
unable to get the money back from the tortfeasor. However, it is 
more unfair for Peterson not to receive the benefit of underinsured 
coverage when he has not been made whole and has paid the premiums. 
In essence, Farm Bureau is disturbed that it, the insurance 
company, must bear the risk of tortfeasor insolvency or immunity 
rather than its insured. As a matter of sound public policy, it is 
more appropriate that insurance companies rather than insureds bear 
the risk of loss. 
Farm Bureau's last argument merits little response. Farm 
Bureau argues that Peterson may not recover underinsured coverage 
because he has not recovered from the liability policy of the 
tortfeasor. The critical inquiry is whether there is "insufficient 
liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all 
special and general damages." U.C.A. Section 31A-22-305(8)(a). In 
the context of a work-related auto accident, the issue is whether 
workers' compensation benefits have compensated the employee for 
all special and general damages. This is a question of fact which 
has not yet been resolved in this matter. 
Liability coverage in this context need not refer solely 
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to automobile liability coverage, but could also refer to workers' 
compensation coverage or perhaps even coverage pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. The important issue is whether the 
injured party has been made whole. If the insured has, then no 
underinsured coverage is available. If not, then underinsured 
coverage is available. 
CONCLUSION 
Peterson respectfully requests that the trial court's 
decision to dismiss Peterson's complaint be reversed and the case 
be remanded for further proceedings to assess the severity of 
Peterson's injuries. 
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